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Economic theorists characterize an individual decision maker using three basic con-
cepts:
(1) A collection of objects: The manner in which a decision maker perceives an object
does not have to be objective. For example, one decision maker might think about a red
triangle as a triangle while another might think about it as a red object.
(2) Mental preferences: These describe the mental attitude of an individual toward the
objects. They can be de¯ned in contexts which do not involve actual choice. In particular,
preferences can describe tastes (such as a preference for one season over another) or can
refer to situations which are only hypothetical (such as the possible courses of action
available to an individual were he to become Emperor of Rome) or which the individual
does not fully control (such as a game situation in which a player has preferences over the
entire set of outcomes).
(3) Choice: It is customary to describe a choice situation using a set of objects the
individual can choose from. A choice function spells out how the individual will respond
to any choice situation he might face.
The standard economic approach assumes that a decision maker is rational in the sense
that (i) in any choice situation within the domain of his choice function he objectively
identi¯es the set of objects (ii) his choice function is consistent with maximization of
some preference relation which we will refer to as the behavioral preferences and (iii) the
behavioral preferences are identical to the mental preferences.
The Principle of Revealed Preference, as we understand it, is a methodological paradigm
which follows the standard economic approach, whereby observed choices are used only
to reveal the mental preferences of the individual over the set of objects as perceived by
the modeler.
1We thank Douglas Gale, Andy Schotter and Rani Spiegler for most helpful comments.
1In this short paper we wish to make three statements about the way that economists
view this principle as a modeling guide.
Statement 1. There is no escape from including mental entities, such as the way in
which an individual perceives the objects and his mental preferences, in economic models.
Statement 2. Economists should be also looking at models in which the observed
choice leads to conclusions other than that the chosen element is always mentally preferred
to the other elements in the set.
Statement 3. There is room for models in which the observable information about
a choice situation is richer than just the set of available alternatives and the alternative
chosen.
Before proceeding, we need to introduce some standard notation and de¯nitions. Let
X be a ¯nite set of alternatives. A choice problem is a non-empty subset of X. Let D be
the collection of all choice problems. A choice function c attaches to every choice problem
A 2 D a single element c(A) 2 A. A choice function informs us that the individual
chooses the element c(A) when facing the choice problem A. A choice correspondence C
attaches to every A 2 D a non-empty subset C(A) µ A. The interpretation of a choice
correspondence is more subtle than that of a choice function. We follow the approach
whereby C(A) is the set of alternatives which are chosen from the choice problem A
under certain additional circumstances which are not part of the model.
A choice function c satis¯es the property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA) if c(B) 2 A µ B implies that c(A) = c(B). A choice correspondence C satis¯es
the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WA) if a;b 2 A \ B, a 2 C(A) and b 2 C(B)
imply that a 2 C(B). When C(A) is always a singleton, WA is equivalent to IIA.
We say that a choice function c (correspondence C) is rationalizable if there exists
a preference relation % such that c(A) is the %-maximal element in A (C(A) is the set
of all %-maximal element in A) for every A 2 D. A choice function (correspondence) is
rationalizable if and only if it satis¯es IIA (WA).
Statement 1. There is no escape from including mental entities, such as the
way in which an individual perceives the objects and his mental preferences,
in economic models.
If the individual in an economic model were treated as a robot who receives a de-
scription of a choice problem as input and produces a chosen element as output, then the
assumption that his behavior is rationalizable would lack any mental meaning. It would
2be interpreted solely as a procedural property: the choices made by the individual are
independent of the procedure he uses to make them. (When IIA is violated, the order
in which the decision maker makes his choices becomes crucial in describing his behavior.
For example, if an individual chooses a from fa;b;cg and b from fa;bg, then his response
to the task \choose from a, b and c" di®ers from his response to a two-stage task in which
he ¯rst has the option of choosing c and, if he does not, he must then choose between a
and b.)
However, as economists, we are interested not just in describing the behavior of indi-
viduals but also their well-being. When we analyze social mechanisms and make welfare
statements we have in mind the individual's mental preferences, which re°ect his well-
being. We cannot ¯nd any a priori reason to assume that an individual's behavioral
preferences, which describe his choices, fully represent or convey his mental preferences.
On the contrary, there are reasons to assume that they don't.
First, there is often no objective speci¯cation of the outcome space. A decision maker
may have in mind a description of the alternatives which di®ers from that of the modeler
(see Rubinstein (1991)).
Example 1. Assume that a decision maker receives a pair of ¯les of candidates A
and B piled alphabetically and chooses A. An observer might conclude that the decision
maker prefers A to B. However, assume that unlike the observer, the decision maker
ignores the content of the ¯les and pays attention only to the location of each ¯le in
the pile. He simply prefers the top location in the pile to the bottom location. In this
case, the observer's interpretation that the individual has chosen the \best" candidate is
incorrect.
Second, the decision maker might be operating in a very systematic way but not
according to his mental preferences. Following is an extreme example (see Rubinstein
(2006)):
Example 2. An individual has in mind a clear notion of utility which expresses his
desires. Imagine that we are even able to measure his utility using an \ultimate happiness
measure". However, the individual behaves in a way that is consistent with minimizing
this measure of utility. This might be due to a mistake in his \operating system", due
to some mental problem or simply because he applies a rule of thumb which has nothing
to do with his mental preferences. Of course, in this case the individual's choice function
is rationalizable, i.e. there exists a preference relation whose maximization describes
the individual's behavior. However, this preference relation is clearly the opposite of
the individual's mental preferences and it would be absurd to consider his behavioral
3preferences as an indication of his well-being.
The importance of referring to mental preferences is revealed when we consider the
basic welfare concept of Pareto e±ciency. Pareto e±ciency is an intuitively appealing
concept because everybody can be made better o® by moving from a Pareto-dominated
outcome to a Pareto-dominant one. However, this intuition is often based on viewing
preferences as being mental.
One could argue that the meaning of a Pareto-ine±cient outcome is that it is unstable
even when de¯ned with respect to behavioral preferences. According to this interpretation,
an ine±cient outcome is unstable since every individual will choose to support a move
to the Pareto-dominant outcome. However, note that an individual's preference for a
Pareto-dominant outcome over a Pareto-dominated one usually involves a change in the
behavior of other individuals and therefore may not be observable in any choice situation.
Thus, it must have an additional mental meaning.
Example 3: Consider a 2 £ 2 coordination game with two actions fa;bg available
to each player. Assume that both players have the same mental preferences over the
outcomes of the game: (a;a) Â (b;b) Â (a;b) » (b;a). Thus, (a;a) and (b;b) are the two
pure strategy equilibria of the game and (a;a) is Pareto-superior to (b;b). The rankings
(a;a) Â (b;a) and (b;b) Â (a;b) are revealed by the actions of Player 1. However, the
ranking between (a;a) and (b;b) is not revealed in any choice situation associated with the
game since Player 1 does not control Player 2's actions. Thus, the statement \(b;b) is an
undesirable equilibrium and (a;a) is a desirable one" is based on each player's preference
for (a;a) over (b;b), a preference which is not revealed by the choices of the players.
Thus, even the basic welfare criterion of Pareto e±ciency cannot be based solely on
behavioral preferences without referring also to mental preferences.
Statement 2. Economists should be also looking at models in which the
observed choice leads to conclusions other than that the chosen element is
always mentally preferred to the other elements in the set.
Some choice procedures violate the weak axiom of revealed preference (or the IIA
property) and thus are not consistent with maximizing a preference relation. In such
cases, there is no basis to conclude from an observed choice that the chosen element is
always preferred to the other elements in the set. Nevertheless, other conclusions about
the properties of a choice procedure can be drawn. This is in fact the objective of axiomatic
analysis of a choice procedure.
4To demonstrate this point, consider the Post-Dominance Rationality (PDR) choice
procedure discussed in Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Rubinstein and Salant (2006b).2
According to the PDR procedure, the decision maker ¯rst simpli¯es a given choice problem
by eliminating any alternative which he feels is dominated in some sense by another
alternative in the set. He then chooses the best alternative among those that remain.
For example, consider an individual who chooses among hotel resorts in the following
manner: He ¯rst eliminates any resort for which there is another with more stars and
a lower per-night price. He then applies a complicated rule to choose from among the
remaining resorts. Formally, the decision maker's choice procedure is characterized by
two binary relations:
(i) A dominance relation R which is acyclic.
(ii) A post-dominance relation Â which is complete and transitive whenever restricted
to sets of elements that do not dominate one another.
When facing a choice problem A, the decision maker ¯rst identi¯es the set of non-
dominated elements according to R and then chooses the Â-maximal element from among
them.
Obviously, this choice procedure generates choices that may violate IIA. For example,
let X = fa;b;cg, bRc and a Â b Â c Â a. The PDR procedure based on these parameters
violates IIA since a is chosen from fa;b;cg but c is chosen from fa;cg.
The following behavioral property characterizes a choice function c induced by a PDR
procedure: If adding an element a to a choice problem A implies that neither the previ-
ously chosen element c(A) nor the new element a is chosen from the new set, then c(A) is
never chosen from a choice problem that includes a. Formally, a choice function c satis¯es
Exclusion Consistency if for every set A and for every a 2 X, if c(A [ fag) = 2 fc(A);ag
then there is no set A0 which contains a such that c(A0) = c(A).
It is straightforward to verify that a PDR choice procedure induces a choice function
that satis¯es Exclusion Consistency. Indeed, consider a PDR choice procedure based on
a dominance relation R and a post-dominance relation Â. Then the chosen element from
a set A is the Â-maximal element among the R-maximal elements in A. We need to
show that the induced choice function c satis¯es Exclusion Consistency. Assume that
the element a is chosen from the choice problem A and that the element a0 = 2 fa;bg
is chosen from A [ fbg. It must be that bRa. Otherwise, the element a continues to
be non-dominated in A [ fbg and the only (possibly) new non-dominated element is b,
2Manzini and Mariotti (2007) and Rubinstein and Salant (2006b) di®er in the details of the axiom-
atization of the PDR choice procedure. We follow Rubinstein and Salant (2006b) here. For additional
interesting examples, see Masatlioglu and Ok (2005, 2006).
5which means that either a or b is chosen from A [ fbg. By the de¯nition of PDR, since b
dominates a, the element a is never chosen from sets in which b appears.
One can also show that a choice function that satis¯es Exclusion Consistency can be
represented as a PDR choice procedure. The proof of this statement is important to our
argument since it contains a construction of a dominance relation and a post-dominance
relation based only on the choices of the individual. Thus, assume c satis¯es Exclusion
Consistency. We de¯ne the two binary relations R and Â as follows:
(i) aRb if there is a set A such that c(A) = b and c(A [ fag) = 2 fa;bg.
(ii) a Â b if c(fa;bg) = a.
The relation R is acyclic. If there were a cycle then by Exclusion Consistency no
element could be chosen from the set of all elements in the cycle. The relation Â is
asymmetric and complete. The relation Â is transitive when restricted to sets of elements
that are not related to one another by R. Otherwise, assume that a Â b, b Â c and
c Â a and that a;b and c are not related by R. Without loss of generality, assume that
c(fa;b;cg) = b. Then, since c(fa;bg) = a we should have cRa which is a contradiction.
Since R is acyclic and Â is complete and transitive when restricted to sets of elements
that do not dominate one another, the PDR procedure based on R and Â chooses exactly
one element from every set A. It is not di±cult to complete the proof and show that the
element chosen by the procedure is identical to c(A).
To conclude, an essential component of the principle of revealed preference is that one
should be able to deduce the parameters of the choice procedure from behavior. With the
rational man's choice procedure in mind, we elicit a single preference relation from a choice
function by the inference that choosing a when b is available means that a is at least as
good as b. Analogously, with the PDR choice procedure in mind, we elicit a dominance
relation and a post-dominance relation. Of course, di®erent \deduction rules" should
be applied to di®erent choice procedures. But, nonetheless, economic analysis based on
observables can accommodate choice procedures other than the rational man's, in which
the parameters of the procedure are elicited from observable information as in the case of
the rational man.
Statement 3. There is room for models in which the observable information
about a choice situation is richer than just the set of available alternatives and
the alternative chosen.
Classical choice theory usually assumes that a researcher observes a pair (A;a) with
the interpretation that the decision maker chooses the alternative a from the choice set
6A. However, in many cases, additional information relevant to choice is available in the
same sense that the set of alternatives and the chosen alternative are available. Accepting
the idea that the analysis of the decision maker's behavior should depend on observables
implies that we should use a model of choice that takes this information into account
rather than a model that ignores it.
Consider, for example, the model of order-dependent choice in which the alternatives
are presented to the decision maker in the form of a list of distinct elements of X. It is
actually quite common that a choice problem is presented as a list rather than as a set.
For example, when purchasing a product online, the alternatives are positioned in some
order or when looking for a job o®ers are received sequentially. A decision maker who
uses a systematic method to choose from lists may choose di®erently from two di®erent
lists that induce the same set of alternatives.
In Rubinstein and Salant (2006a) we investigate some properties of choice functions
from lists which assign a chosen element to every list. In particular, we analyze the
following property:
Partition Independence (PI): Dividing a list arbitrarily into several sublists, choosing
an element from each and then choosing from the list of chosen elements yields the same
result as choosing from the original list.
PI is satis¯ed by the rational procedure as well as by the satis¯cing procedure (Simon
(1955)). According to the satis¯cing procedure, the decision maker classi¯es each element
as either satisfactory or non-satisfactory and chooses the ¯rst satisfactory element from
each list (if no such element exists, we assume that he chooses the last element in the
list). In fact, we show that PI characterizes a larger class of choice functions from lists.
In this class, each function is parameterized by a preference relation % over X and a
labeling of every %-indi®erence set by \First" or \Last". Given a list, the decision maker
¯rst identi¯es the set of %-maximal elements within that list. He then chooses the ¯rst or
the last element among them according to the label of the %-indi®erence set they belong
to. For example, in the satis¯cing procedure, there are two indi®erence classes of the
preference relation: the class of satisfactory elements labeled by First, and the class of
non-satisfactory elements labeled by Last. The family of functions satisfying PI naturally
generalizes the class of preference-maximizing procedures in the context of standard choice
functions.
We then relate the notion of a choice function from lists to the standard notion of a
choice correspondence by assigning to every set all the elements chosen for some listing
of that set. For example, a satis¯cing procedure induces a choice correspondence which
7chooses all the satisfactory elements from every set; if there are none, the correspondence
chooses the entire set. We show that a choice function from lists satisfying PI induces a
choice correspondence satisfying WA. Conversely, if a choice correspondence satis¯es WA,
it can be \explained" by a choice function from lists satisfying PI.
One might therefore argue that there is no need to study choice from lists since the
outcome (in terms of choice correspondences) is indistinguishable from that of a corre-
spondence satisfying WA. We would argue that this is not the case. The two terms are
indistinguishable only if we choose to ignore the additional information which is often
observable (especially when the list is generated by an exogenous mechanism, as in the
case of entrees listed on a menu or products listed in a sales brochure). In such cases, the
notion of a choice function from lists is typically richer than a standard choice correspon-
dence and provides a more accurate description of behavior. So why should we ignore this
additional information? As we remarked earlier, an essential component of the principle
of revealed preference is that one should be able to deduce the parameters of the choice
procedure based on behavior. But there is no reason to adopt a position which restricts
the scope of the observable information to the set of alternatives and the actual choice.
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